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The protection of cultural heritage is a fundamental public interest, 
closely connected to fundamental human rights and deemed to be among 
the best guarantees of international peace and security.  Economic 
globalization has spurred a more intense dialogue and interaction among 
nations, potentially promoting cultural diversity.  However, this 
phenomenon may also jeopardize cultural heritage.  Foreign direct 
investments in the extraction of natural resources have the ultimate 
capacity to change cultural landscapes and erase memories.  Foreign 
investment in cultural industries can induce cultural homogenization.  
However, international investment law constitutes a legally binding and 
highly effective regime that requires that states promote and facilitate 
foreign direct investment.  Does the existing legal framework adequately 
protect cultural heritage vis-à-vis economic globalization? 
This Article investigates the distinct interplay between the promotion of 
foreign direct investment and the protection of cultural heritage in 
international law, addressing the question of whether a lex administrativa 
culturalis, or cultural administrative law, has emerged.  In particular, this 
Article questions whether international investment law and arbitration can 
be a tool for enforcing international cultural law and whether arbitral 
tribunals can promote good and effective cultural governance. 
INTRODUCTION 
The historical town of Vilnius, Lithuania, figures in the World Heritage 
List1 as a cultural heritage site of outstanding universal value.  Not only is 
Vilnius one of the finest old towns in Central Europe, having preserved a 
number of “Gothic, Renaissance, Baroque and classical buildings,” but its 
medieval structure also “exercised a profound influence on architectural and 
cultural developments in a wide area of Eastern Europe over several 
centuries.”2  A Norwegian investor participated in a bid to build a parking 
area under the historical center of the town.3  The investor’s project 
 
1  The World Heritage List includes 1,007 properties. U.N. Educ., Sci., and Cultural 
Org. [UNESCO], World Heritage List, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Jan. 29, 
2015). The Convention entered into force on December 17, 1975. UNESCO Convention for 
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 19, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 1358. 
2  UNESCO, Vilnius Historic Centre, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/541 (last visited Jan. 
29, 2015). 
3   Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, ¶¶ 62-
65 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://italaw.com/cases/812. 
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submission included an excavation under the Cathedral.4  Cultural heritage 
impact assessments, which are required by law, revealed that the project 
could have jeopardized the cultural heritage of the town.5  Nonetheless, 
when the Lithuanian government rejected the project on cultural heritage 
grounds and selected another project that did not include excavation under 
the Cathedral, the investor filed an investment treaty arbitration.6  Was it 
legitimate for the Municipality of Vilnius to prefer another contractor in 
order to limit the perceived risk of damaging its cultural heritage? 
In another recent dispute, a U.S. company filed an investment treaty 
arbitration against Ukraine because Ukraine required that fifty percent of 
each radio company’s general broadcasting be Ukrainian music.7  The 
claimant argued that the local music requirement breached the investment 
treaty provision prohibiting the state from obligating foreign companies to 
buy local goods.8  The claimant contended, “We should allow the audience 
to determine what it wants and we think that since Ukraine is seeking the 
status of a country with a market-economy, it should not introduce 
Ukrainian culture by force. . . .”9  Is the local music requirement justified on 
public policy grounds as part of the State’s legitimate right to preserve 
cultural inheritance?10  The arbitral tribunal held that the condition on the 
bidding process “was a legitimate decision, based on a public interest 
choice to extend the use of Ukrainian in the media,” and arguably 
contributing to the diffusion of Ukrainian culture.11  But the investor’s 
argument was in fact supportive of cultural diversity and individual 
freedoms, was it not? 
These cases could not be more different.  They involve different 
 
4   Id. ¶¶ 378, 380. 
5   Id. ¶ 388. 
6   Id. ¶¶ 280, 363. 
7  Lemire v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, ¶ 
218 (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0453.pdf. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. ¶ 406. 
10  Language is a controversial issue in Ukraine. Since its independence in 1991, and for 
almost two decades after, Ukrainian has been the only official language despite the presence 
of linguistic minorities. When a 2012 bill elevated languages spoken by at least ten percent 
of a region to the status of “regional language,” there was uproar in the Parliament. Reuters, 
Ukraine in Uproar Over Status of Russian Language, MOSCOW TIMES, May 28, 2012, 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/ukraine-in-uproar-over-status-of-russian-
language/459335.html. On February 22, 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament repealed the 2012 
bill. Palash R. Ghosh, Watch Your Tongue: Language Controversy One of Fundamental 
Conflicts in Ukraine, INT’L BUS. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2014, http://www.ibtimes.com/watch-your-
tongue-language-controversy-one-fundamental-conflicts-ukraine-1559069. 
11  Lemire, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, ¶ 407. 
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claimants, different respondents, different treaties, and even different 
arbitral tribunals.  Yet, they have an important commonality: the clash 
between the protection of foreign direct investment and the conservation of 
cultural heritage.12 
Cultural heritage is a multifaceted concept that includes both tangible 
(e.g., monuments, sites, and cultural landscapes) and intangible cultural 
resources (e.g., music, cultural practices, and food preparation).  While 
culture represents inherited values, ideas, and traditions, which characterize 
social groups and their behavior, heritage indicates something to be 
cherished and handed down from one generation to another.  There is no 
single definition of cultural heritage in international law; rather, different 
legal instruments provide ad hoc definitions that often focus on distinct 
categories of cultural heritage (e.g., intangible cultural heritage or 
underwater cultural heritage) rather than approaching cultural heritage 
holistically.13 
Although economic globalization and international economic governance 
have spurred a more intense dialogue and interaction among nations, 
potentially promoting cultural diversity and providing funds to recover and 
preserve cultural heritage, these phenomena may also jeopardize cultural 
heritage.  Asymmetrical flows and exchanges of cultural goods may lead to 
cultural homogenization.14  Similarly, foreign direct investment in the 
extractive industries has the capacity to change cultural landscapes.15  At 
the same time, the privileged regime created by international investment 
law within the boundaries of the host state has increasingly displayed a 
tension between investors’ rights and the regulatory autonomy of the host 
state in the cultural field.16 
Under most investment treaties, states have “agreed to give arbitrators a 
comprehensive jurisdiction over what are essentially regulatory disputes.”17 
Modern investment treaties do not require home-state intervention to further 
 
12  See generally id.; Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lith., ICSID Case No. 
ARB/05/8 (Sept. 11, 2007), http://italaw.com/cases/812. 
13  See Francesco Francioni, Culture, Heritage and Human Rights: An Introduction, in 
CULTURAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., 2008); Manlio 
Frigo, Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A “Battle of Concepts” in International 
Law?, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 367 (2004). 
14  VALENTINA VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 162 (2014) [hereinafter VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE]. 
15  Id. at 161-62. 
16  See generally id. 
17  VALENTINA VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND 
ARBITRATION 20 (2013) [hereinafter VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH]. 
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a dispute.18  In practice, this means that foreign investors have increasingly 
claimed that cultural policies violate international investment law before 
investment treaty arbitral tribunals.19  Arbitral tribunals are given the power 
to review the exercise of public authority and determine the appropriate 
boundary between two conflicting values: the legitimate sphere for state 
cultural heritage protection on the one hand, and the protection of private 
property from state interference on the other.20  Both cultural heritage 
protection and the promotion of economic activities are important public 
interests that can contribute to economic growth and the common good.  
Yet, arbitral tribunals do not have a specific mandate to ascertain the 
adequate protection of cultural heritage.  Have these arbitrations 
accommodated the cultural values at stake? 
The tension between the protection of cultural heritage and economic 
globalization constitutes but one paradigmatic example of the clash between 
the state regulatory power and international economic integration.  Yet, 
despite its importance, it has remained underexplored.  A survey of cases 
shows that international investment law has developed limited institutional 
machinery—such as exceptions—for the protection of cultural heritage 
through dispute settlement: there is no built-in requirement of expert 
opinions or consultation with other international bodies (e.g., the World 
Heritage Committee).  Arbitral tribunals scrutinize cultural policies to 
determine whether they are enacted in the public interest or are a disguised 
means of protectionism, and whether the state has struck a proper balance 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.21  Given 
the significant and consistently increasing number of international disputes, 
which present cultural elements due to increasing economic integration, the 
interaction between the protection of cultural heritage and economic 
globalization deserves further scrutiny. 
When should economic interests yield to the protection of cultural 
heritage?  When should cultural arguments yield to the protection of 
economic freedoms?  At their core, cultural heritage disputes involve a 
society’s most cherished values that define a nation’s identity.  The 
protection of cultural heritage can be thought of as a public interest, but it 
also encapsulates the common interest of mankind, transcending borders 
and stressing the common bonds that link the international community as a 
 
18  Id. at 19. 
19  Valentina Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis? The Adjudication of 
Cultural Disputes Before Investment Arbitral Tribunals 4 (Jean Monnet Working Paper 
Program, Working Paper No. 17/14, 2014) [hereinafter Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa 
Culturalis?]. 
20  Id. at 3. 
21  Id. at 16. 
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whole.22  At the same time, economic freedoms can also promote the free 
flow of ideas, cultural diversity, and equality of opportunities, as well as 
social and economic welfare.23 
There is no international court for cultural disputes.  Yet, a notable 
unintended consequence of increased economic globalization is the 
adjudication of cultural heritage related disputes by investment treaty 
tribunals.24  The international tribunals’ review of domestic regulations in 
the cultural sector can improve good cultural governance and the 
transparent pursuit of legitimate cultural policies.25  In fact, the growing 
importance of such tribunals shows that most governments will have to 
consider the impact of regulations (including cultural policies) on foreign 
investors and their investments before the enactment of such measures to 
avoid potential claims and subsequent liability. 
Yet, global cultural governance by investment treaty arbitral tribunals is 
also a matter of great concern.  The adjudication of cultural heritage related 
disputes by arbitral tribunals may cause a regulatory chill, as states may be 
wary of possible investment disputes and thus avoid adopting conservation 
measures.  Moreover, arbitral tribunals are of limited jurisdiction and 
cannot adjudicate on the eventual violation of cultural heritage law.  
Furthermore, even if they could, there is no hierarchical relationship 
between different treaty systems.26  Rather, contemporary international 
relations are conceptualized as a network system.27  As it is difficult to 
foresee and govern the interaction of different legal regimes at the 
normative level, governance in this area is left to the adjudicators.  Thus, 
there is a risk that investment treaty tribunals dilute or neglect significant 
cultural aspects, eventually emphasizing economic interests.  Furthermore, 
international adjudicators may be perceived as detached from local 
 
22  Valentina Vadi, Public Goods, Foreign Investments and the International Protection 
of Cultural Heritage, in INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR COMMON GOODS – NORMATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURE AND NATURE 231, 231 (Federico Lenzerini & 
Ana Filipa Vrdoljak eds., 2014) (considering cultural heritage as a public good that is worthy 
of protection). 
23  See Barnali Choudhury, International Investment Law as a Global Public Good, 17 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 481 (2013) (considering foreign direct investments as public goods 
that are worthy of protection). 
24  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14, at 48. 
25  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 17-18. 
26  See, e.g., Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural 
Expressions art. 20, Oct. 20, 2005, 45 I.L.M. 269, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf. 
27  MICHEL VAN DEN KERCHOV & FRANÇOIS OST, DE LA PYRAMIDE AU RÉSEAU? POUR 
UNE THÉORIE DIALECTIQUE DU DROIT (2002). 
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communities and their cultural concerns.  They may not have specific 
expertise in cultural heritage law as the criteria for their appointment 
emphasizes expertise in international investment law.  Nevertheless, 
allegedly cultural measures may constitute a breach of relevant investment 
treaty provisions. 
Have arbitral tribunals paid any attention to cultural heritage? Are they 
imposing standards of good cultural governance by adopting general 
administrative law principles, such as proportionality, due process, and 
reasonableness?  Are they contributing to the emergence of a lex 
administrativa culturalis, a cultural administrative law?  Or, rather, are they 
“expropriating” certain fundamental aspects of cultural governance from 
states?28  The critical assessment of such jurisprudence may help in 
detecting common patterns, eventually leading to the coalescence of general 
principles of law and requiring a balance between the protection of cultural 
heritage and investors’ entitlements.  My previous book, Cultural Heritage 
in International Investment Law and Arbitration, surveyed virtually all of 
the reported awards that related to cultural heritage and classified them 
according to (1) the type of cultural heritage involved, such as world 
heritage or intangible cultural heritage; and (2) the substantive standards of 
investment law involved, such as fair and equitable treatment, full 
protection and security, and non-discrimination.  The adoption of this 
double track highlighted the contribution of such awards to the 
development of international cultural law and international investment law 
respectively.29  This Article will explore the implications of this 
jurisprudence for the eventual emergence of a global cultural law that will 
govern the interplay between private and public interests in cultural 
governance. 
Part I of this Article highlights the main features of cultural heritage law.  
Part II discusses the different types of cultural heritage related disputes.  
Part III examines the conceptualization of investment treaty arbitration as a 
form of global administrative review.  Finally, Part IV addresses whether 
investment treaty tribunals are contributing to the emergence of a lex 
administrativa culturalis. 
I. TOWARDS A MULTIPOLAR CULTURAL LAW 
Cultural governance has come of age.  Once the domain of elitist scholars 
and practitioners, cultural governance—the multi-level and multi-polar 
regulation of cultural heritage—has emerged as a new frontier of study and 
 
28  This expression is borrowed from KYLA TIENHAARA, THE EXPROPRIATION OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE 3 (2009). 
29  See VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14. 
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come to the forefront of legal debate.30  Cultural governance provides a 
good example of legal pluralism because a multiplicity of different bodies 
govern cultural heritage at national, regional, and international levels.31  
While states maintain primary responsibilities in the cultural field, other 
actors now play an important role with regard to cultural heritage.  The 
actors range from international administrative bodies to private actors and 
from national courts and tribunals to investment treaty arbitrators. 
Two dualisms characterize current cultural heritage law: the distinction 
between public and private law and the division between domestic and 
international law.  Most cultural heritage law scholars tend to approach 
cultural heritage law from a public or private international law perspective, 
or a public or private domestic law perspective.32 
However, these traditional boundaries are blurry in contemporary cultural 
heritage law because both private and public traits and national and 
international dimensions constantly interact in several different ways.  
Private actors often file claims against state actors for the recovery of 
cultural property looted in times of war or for the violation of cultural 
entitlements before human rights courts and tribunals.  Private actors may 
file admiralty claims to establish title to sunken vessels, upon which, in 
turn, states may assert public-property and sovereign-immunity defenses.33  
Foreign investors may also file claims against the host state alleging that the 
state’s cultural policies amount to disguised discrimination or an indirect 
expropriation of an investment.  On the other hand, art and heritage inter-
state disputes are also adjudicated before the International Court of Justice 
(“ICJ”)34 and other international dispute settlement bodies.  The cultural 
 
30  See, e.g., ART AND CULTURAL HERITAGE – LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE (Barbara T. 
Hoffmann ed., 2006); CULTURAL HERITAGE ISSUES: THE LEGACY OF CONQUEST, 
COLONIZATION AND COMMERCE (James A.R. Nafziger & Ann M. Nicgorski eds., 2009). 
31  DIANA ZACHARIAS, THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE PROTECTION OF WORLD 
CULTURAL AND NATURAL HERITAGE – A CONTRIBUTION TO INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW (2007). 
32  See, e.g., John Henry Merryman & James A.R. Nafziger, The Private International 
Law of Cultural Property in the United States, 42 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 221, 243 (1994) 
(adopting a private international law perspective). But see Wojciech W. Kowalski, 
Restitution of Works of Art Pursuant to Private and Public International Law, 288 RECUEIL 
DES COURS 9 (2001) (adopting both private and public international law perspectives). 
33  See, e.g., James A.R. Nafziger, The Evolving Role of Admiralty Courts in Litigation 
of Historic Wreck, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 251 (2003). 
34  See, e.g., Certain Property (Liech. v. Ger.), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 10); 
Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Judgment, 1962 I.C.J. 6 (June 15); Temple of 
Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thai.), Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 15 June 
1962, Request by the Kingdom of Cambodia for the Indication of Provisional Measures 
(Apr. 28, 2011), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/151/16470.pdf. 
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interests at stake present a complexity that is nonexistent in other areas of 
the law: a mixture of private and public interests, which at times coincide 
(i.e., the protection of a cultural item), and at times conflict (i.e., the clash 
of private economic or cultural interests with collective cultural or 
economic entitlements).35 
Public and private actors increasingly regulate cultural law at both the 
national and international levels.  The United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) plays a leading role in 
the making of cultural law at the international law level.36  UNESCO 
gained momentum in the aftermath of World War II owing to the rising 
awareness “that a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic 
arrangements of governments” would not last long.37  Thus, the diffusion of 
culture and education was deemed to be “indispensable to the dignity of 
man, and to constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a 
spirit of mutual assistance and concern.”38  More importantly, UNESCO 
aims to “advance[e], through the educational and scientific and cultural 
relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace 
and of the common welfare of mankind.”39 
UNESCO has produced an important corpus juris culturalis, including 
conventions, non-binding (but influential and morally persuasive) 
declarations, and guidelines which have gradually extended the scope of 
cultural heritage law.40  UNESCO lawmaking has raised awareness of the 
importance of heritage protection and spurred the development of domestic 
cultural policies.41  Such instruments provide a compelling case for the 
consideration of cultural concerns in policymaking and adjudication.  
International and national frameworks of cultural heritage law have 
complemented and reinforced one another.  For instance, the 1970 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, 
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property42 inspired national 
 
35  JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN 
CULTURAL TREASURES 197-98 (1999). 
36  Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Nov. 16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 (entered into force Nov. 4, 1946). 
37  Id. at 276. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 
xx-xxi (2010). 
41  See generally 1 STANDARD-SETTING IN UNESCO: NORMATIVE ACTION IN 
EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND CULTURE (Abdulqawi A. Yusuf ed., 2007). 
42  Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231. 
VADI - GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/15  4:37 PM 
110 BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL[Vol. 33:nnn 
 
legislation.  On the other hand, the protection of indigenous artifacts at the 
national level inspired international instruments that concerned indigenous 
cultural heritage.  Despite inevitable gaps and frequent conflicts between 
states and UNESCO bodies regarding the interpretation and application of 
UNESCO instruments, the interplay between the national and international 
bodies has been constant due to the almost global ratification of the 
UNESCO conventions.43 
Private actors have also enacted elements of cultural law.  Museums’ 
associations at the national level, and the International Council of Museums 
(“ICOM”)44 at the international level, have produced self-regulatory 
instruments, guidelines, and texts which are now of crucial importance in 
grasping the complex features of certain areas of cultural law.45  At the 
same time, the International Council on Monuments and Sites 
(“ICOMOS”)46 and other non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) have 
adopted a number of instruments on the protection of monuments.47  Even 
regional NGOs have been active in the field of cultural law.48 
A sort of mimesis and dialectic exists between the private and public 
dimensions of cultural law.  There is an increasing awareness that cultural 
 
43  FORREST, supra note 40, app. I. 
44  The International Council of Museums (“ICOM”), an organization established in 
1946, “sets standards for museums in design, management and collections organization.” See 
ICOM Missions, ICOM MUSEUM, http://icom.museum/the-organisation/icom-missions (last 
visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
45  For instance, the ICOM Code of Ethics for Museums is “a reference in the global 
museum community. It establishes minimum standards for professional practices and 
achievements for museums and their employees. By joining ICOM, each member is 
committed to respecting this code.” See ICOM Missions, ICOM MUSEUM, 
http://icom.museum/the-organisation/icom-missions/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). 
46  ICOMOS is a non-governmental international organization dedicated to the 
conservation of the world’s monuments and other cultural sites. Based in Paris, ICOMOS 
was founded in 1965. See The Organisation, ICOM MUSEUM, http://icom.museum/the-
organisation (last visited Nov. 24, 2014). 
47  See, e.g., International Council on Monuments and Sites [ICOMOS], Historic 
Gardens (The Florence Charter 1981), available at 
http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/gardens_e.pdf; The Venice Charter – 
International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments (1964), reprinted 
in MICHAEL PETZET, INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF PRESENTATION 47 (2009), available at 
http://www.icomos.de/pdf/principles.pdf; The Athens Charter for the Restoration of Historic 
Monuments (1931), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL CHARTERS FOR CONSERVATION AND 
RESTORATION 31 (2d ed. 2004), available at 
http://openarchive.icomos.org/431/1/Monuments_and_Sites_1_Charters.pdf. 
48  See, e.g., European Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Traditional Ships 
in Operation (The Barcelona Charter) (2002), available at http://www.european-maritime-
heritage.org/docs/Barcelona%20Charter.pdf. 
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resources require public intervention and the conservation and safeguarding 
of cultural heritage includes elements of intra- and inter-generational equity 
due to the existence of undeniable public interests.  However, public law 
looks to private law to learn from its arguments and dispute-resolution 
mechanisms.  Private funding is also needed to recover and protect cultural 
heritage.  The privatization of some aspects of cultural heritage governance 
has been criticized by art historians because of the risk of overemphasizing 
the economic dimension of heritage.49  Yet, the need for cooperation 
between the private and public sectors is particularly evident in times of 
economic crisis.50 
A similar mimesis and dialectic emerges between the local and global 
dimensions of cultural governance.  Global governance favors experts over 
non-experts; the relevant epistemic communities and networks consist of 
professionals and specialists.51  Under global cultural governance, decision-
making processes tend to be elitist and opaque and express top-down 
approaches.52  Such approaches may not necessarily be responsive to local 
needs.  Human rights bodies, which have condemned the forced eviction of 
local communities from heritage sites, have advocated for the need to 
humanize cultural heritage law.53  Local governance may emphasize local 
needs that, in certain cases, may sensibly diverge from international 
standards. 
The different approaches to the conservation of cultural heritage are 
reflected in the traditional debate between nationalists and internationalists 
in cultural heritage law.54  While internationalists perceive cultural heritage 
as expressing a common human culture, wherever its place and location, 
nationalists perceive cultural property as part of the national cultural 
 
49  See SALVATORE SETTIS, ITALIA S.P.A (2002). 
50  See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, Greek Antiquities, Long Fragile, Are Endangered by 
Austerity, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/12/arts/design/archaeologists-say-greek-antiquities-
threatened-by-austerity.html; Italy PM Calls on Businesses to Fund Pompeii Repairs, BBC 
NEWS, Mar. 4, 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26457322?print=true. 
51  Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and 
Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 373 (2001). 
52  Id. at 374. 
53  Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. (Kenya) & Minority Rights Grp. Int’l ex rel. Endorois 
Welfare Council v. Kenya (Endorois Decision), Afr. Comm’n Hum. & Peoples’ Rights, 
Comm’n No. 276/03 (2009), available at 
http://www.achpr.org/communications/decision/276.03. 
54  See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property Law, 80 
AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 831-32 (1986). 
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wealth.55  Even assuming that relevant UNESCO conventions incorporate a 
mixture of both approaches, as has been persuasively argued,56 questions 
remain in those cases where the two interests—internationalist and 
nationalist—diverge.  Which interest should prevail in the management of 
cultural heritage sites: the interest of the locals or the interests of the 
international community?  Oftentimes the two interests coincide.  Both 
communities have an interest in the conservation of cultural heritage sites.  
However, when interests collide, national authorities (and adjudicators) face 
the dilemma of whether to comply with international cultural law or to 
fulfill their mandate according to the preferences of their constituencies.  Of 
further concern is the question of how this collision of interests relates to 
foreign investments.  Is there any difference between using the local public 
interest and a global interest as parameters in the interpretation of 
investment law? 
II. CULTURAL GOVERNANCE AS A BATTLEFIELD 
Cultural governance is a place of conflict where the political, economic, 
institutional, and legal interests of multiple players clash.  Given that “it is 
the duty of governments to ensure the protection and the preservation of the 
cultural heritage of mankind, as much as to promote social and economic 
development,”57 it may be difficult to identify the most appropriate 
management of cultural heritage and strike a balance between conservation 
goals and the practical burden that cultural policies place on some (well-
meaning) owners.58  Governing cultural phenomena in accordance with 
national, regional, and international law may be a daunting task for national 
administrations, and it may give rise to political, institutional, and economic 
conflicts. 
Cultural heritage related conflicts of a political nature may arise at the 
national level when different political actors compete for making key 
decisions with regard to heritage sites.  For instance, in Sicily, 
notwithstanding the obligations under the World Heritage Convention to 
protect and preserve the Val di Noto site—a fine example of Baroque art—
 
55  Id. at 837 n.19. 
56  Raechel Anglin, Note, The World Heritage List: Bridging the Cultural Property 
Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 241, 243 (2008) (referencing 
the World Heritage Convention). 
57  UNESCO, Preservation of Cultural Property Endangered by Public or Private 
Works: Draft Recommendation, UNESCO Doc. 15 C/14, annex 1 (July 24, 1968). 
58  See, e.g., Tad Heuer, Living History: How Homeowners in a New Local Historic 
District Negotiate Their Legal Obligations, 116 YALE L.J. 768, 819 (2007) (referring to the 
need of balancing “the preservation of the past, the needs of the present, and the inheritance 
of the future”). 
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local authorities granted a Texan investor, Panther Oil, a concession to drill 
gas in the valley.59  Because the site is considered to be in permanent 
danger of earthquakes and Mount Etna’s eruptions, drilling is risky and 
could cause an environmental collapse.60  Because a regional administrative 
court confirmed the mineral exploitation permits, the “Italian government 
declared its willingness to override Sicily’s autonomy” and to terminate the 
project.61  Voluntarily, Panther Oil decided to reduce the number of wells 
that it planned to drill in the region from twenty-one to eight and to avoid 
the Val di Noto.62 
Cultural heritage conflicts of an economic type may arise when the 
relevant state authorities need to strike a reasonable balance between 
effective cultural heritage protections, as mandated by the relevant 
UNESCO conventions, and other interests, such as economic development.  
This necessarily requires a case-by-case assessment.63  Arguably, the 
conservation of heritage sites has a relatively stable nucleus that requires 
core protection and limits economic activities deemed to be ipso facto in 
conflict with heritage management because those activities could alter the 
physical integrity of a given site.64  For instance, mining or oil and gas 
development have been estimated to threaten more than one-quarter of all 
cultural heritage sites.65  A prohibition against mining may also exist in 
places outside the perimeter of a world heritage site, if such activity could 
damage the site itself by way of pollution or other noxious interferences.  
However, moving from the core of cultural heritage protection to its 
periphery, conservation policies may become more nuanced and contested.  
When the then mayor of Florence, a world heritage site, announced a plan 
to forbid fast food in the historic center of the town,66 questions arose as to 
 
59  Thomas J. Puleo, Baroque Disruptions in Val di Noto, 100 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 476, 
487 (2010). 
60  Silvia Aloisi, Gas War Rages in Sicilian Baroque Valley, REUTERS, June 7, 2007, 
http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKL0713623020070607. 
61  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14, at 251. 
62  Sicilian Valley Wins Battle against Gas Wells, REUTERS, June 17, 2007, 
http://uk.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=UKL0713623020070607. 
63  UNESCO, Recommendation Concerning the Preservation of Cultural Property 
Endangered by Public or Private Works, 15th Sess., ¶ 6 (Nov. 19, 1968), 
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=13085&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html. 
64  Id. ¶ 8(d)-(f). 
65  Natasha Affolder, The Private Life of Environmental Treaties, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 
510, 513 (2009). 
66  The Frenzy over Fast Food, FLORENTINE (Feb. 12, 2009), 
http://www.theflorentine.net/articles/article-view.asp?issuetocId=4052. 
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the legitimacy of this regulatory change.  Should world heritage sites be 
frozen in time or should they respond to international economic integration? 
Institutional cultural heritage conflicts resulted from the emergence of 
supranational public administrations, such as the World Heritage 
Committee.67  Conflicts may arise between these supranational organs and 
local administrations regarding the most appropriate way to govern world 
heritage sites.  Heritage policy discourse is varied.  Preservation policies are 
not uniform and rely on different assumptions as to what is worth being 
protected, why, and how.  For instance, preservationists have long 
discussed whether a site is more important for reasons intrinsic to that site 
or because of its associative value and role in the formation of the cultural 
identity of a given population.68  While the identity-focused “populists” 
hold that the value of specific sites lies in their role in the formation of 
cultural identity (“the heritage people wants”), essentialists argue that 
cultural goods have inherent value (“heritage is heritage”).69  These 
positions have created tensions among heritage scholars as to the 
identification of what is worth being protected, and how to protect it.  For 
instance, in 2004, the Cologne Cathedral in Germany was on the List of 
World Heritage in Danger because of plans to erect several skyscrapers on 
the bank of the Rhine River.70  The local authorities initially contested the 
legitimacy of the expansive interpretation of cultural heritage protection, 
which was endorsed by the World Heritage Committee.  Reportedly, the 
mayor declared that “it was impossible that a city should stop all further 
development because it had a cathedral”71 and that “city planning did not 
fall into the foreign Ministry’s competences.”72  At the end of the day, 
however, the city of Cologne rescaled the projects and the World Heritage 
Committee removed the site from the List of World Heritage in Danger.73  
This was not the result, however, in the case of the Dresden Elbe Valley, 
which was taken off the World Heritage List because plans to build a bridge 
threatened the integrity of the site.74  This conflict was analogized to a 
 
67  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 8. 
68  Christopher Koziol, Historic Preservation Ideology: A Critical Mapping of 
Contemporary Heritage Policy Discourse, 1 PRESERVATION EDUC. & RES. 41, 42 (2008). 
69  Id. 
70  See Diana Zacharias, Cologne Cathedral versus Skyscrapers – World Cultural 
Heritage Protection as Archetype of a Multilevel System, 10 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 273, 
276 (2006). 
71  Id. at 277. 
72  Id. at 279. 
73  Id. at 280-81. 
74  See Sabine von Schorlemer, Compliance with the UNESCO World Heritage 
Convention: Reflections on the Elbe Valley and the Dresden Waldschlösschen Bridge, 51 
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“holy war,” and the federal authorities accepted the removal of Dresden 
from the World Heritage List, respecting the will of the local population.75 
Legal cultural heritage related disputes have grown exponentially and 
may be classified along many different lines.  First, analyzing the dramatis 
personae (the actor and defendant of a given dispute), cultural heritage 
disputes can be categorized as: (1) inter-state disputes; (2) private disputes; 
or (3) mixed disputes (involving a state and a private actor).76  The third 
category, mixed disputes, reflects the fact that “individuals and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) primarily associated with . . . cultural 
heritage . . . play an essential role in the drama of cultural heritage law.”77 
Second, if one studies the petitum (object) and causa petendi (cause of 
action) of a given dispute, most cultural heritage disputes are polycentric, 
involving a number of legal, cultural, and political issues.78  In most cases, 
such disputes involve many legitimate but conflicting interests.  Cultural 
heritage disputes can be classified as cultural heritage disputes stricto sensu 
(in a narrow or strict sense), or cultural heritage disputes lato sensu (in the 
broad sense).  Narrow cultural heritage disputes focus on the fate and 
authenticity of a given cultural artifact (e.g., a colonial object, or an 
allegedly looted artifact).79  Other disputes deal with cultural heritage only 
tangentially.  For instance, there are situations where the cultural object is 
not the petitum or the causa petendi of a given dispute, but rather an action 
against the cultural object is undertaken to enforce arbitral awards related to 
damages for dismissed foreign investments.80  Although broad cultural 
heritage disputes relate to cultural heritage in an oblique or indirect fashion, 
due to their possible consequences for the relevant cultural item, such cases 
nonetheless deserve further scrutiny from a cultural law perspective as they 
tend to be investigated almost exclusively from the perspectives of other 
branches of law, such as international investment law. 
 
GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L., 321, 327 (2008). 
75  Id. at 323. 
76  James A.R. Nafziger, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the English-
Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in 1 THE CULTURAL HERITAGE OF 
MANKIND 145, 147 (James A.R. Nafziger & Tullio Scovazzi eds., 2008). 
77  Id. 
78  See generally Alan Rau, Mediation in Art-Related Disputes, in RESOLUTION 
METHODS FOR ART-RELATED DISPUTES 171 (Quentin Byrne-Sutton & Marc-André Renold 
eds., 1999). 
79  See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (involving the return 
of six of Gustav Klimt’s paintings). For commentary, see NOUT VAN WOUDENBERG, STATE 
IMMUNITY AND CULTURAL OBJECTS ON LOAN (2012); Charles Brower II, Republic of Austria 
v. Altmann, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 236 (2005). 
80  See, e.g., VAN WOUDENBERG, supra note 79.
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Third, concerning the quomodo (methods) of dispute settlement, cultural 
heritage disputes have been adjudicated through a variety of mechanisms, 
including diplomatic efforts, negotiations, mediation,81 conciliation, 
arbitration,82 and judicial proceedings.83  Alternative dispute resolution 
(“ADR”) mechanisms have played an increasingly important role in the 
settlement of art and heritage disputes.  Mediation is an informal dispute 
settlement mechanism in which a neutral third party aids the parties in 
reaching an agreement.84  Mediation can prove to be a particularly suitable 
mechanism in settling art and heritage related disputes.  Mediation assists 
parties in uncovering their true interests, unbundling their concerns, and 
negotiating for mutual gain.  Arbitration also benefits from the presence of 
a neutral third party, but differs from mediation in that the arbitrator has the 
power to impose a binding award on the parties.85  Among the well-known 
advantages of arbitration in cultural heritage is its emphasis on party 
autonomy, which may include the possibility for the parties to delocalize 
the applicable substantive law (lex causae) and the procedural rules guiding 
the dispute (lex arbitri), to select and have expert arbitrators, and to avoid 
the (perceived) bias of national courts while also ensuring confidentiality.86  
ADR and judicial mechanisms are not mutually exclusive.  They can 
reinforce one another’s effectiveness.  However, ADR allows for more 
flexible solutions, potentially preserving the parties’ long-term relationship 
and their reputation, as well as saving costs.87  A number of successful 
cases have been settled through these mechanisms.88 
Finally, if one scrutinizes the ubi consistam (available fora) where 
disputes may be brought, it is evident that the lack of dedicated dispute 
settlement mechanisms at the international and regional level has caused a 
diaspora of the relevant disputes before a host of diverse fora ranging from 
the International Court of Justice to ad hoc international commissions,89 and 
 
81  See generally Rau, supra note 78. 
82  See Elizabeth Varner, Arbitrating Cultural Property Disputes, 13 CARDOZO J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 477, 479 (2012). 
83  ALESSANDRO CHECHI, THE SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE 
DISPUTES 2 (2014). 
84  Id. at 169. 
85  Id. at 181. 
86  Id. at 139. 
87  Id. at 169. 
88  See generally id. 
89  See, for example, the Eritrea–Ethiopia Claims Commission, established by the Peace 
Agreement signed in Algiers on December 12, 2000 between the governments of the State of 
Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (determining, inter alia, Eritrea’s 
claim concerning the alleged intentional destruction by the Ethiopian military of the Stela of 
VADI - GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/15  4:37 PM 
2015] GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE 117 
 
from national courts and tribunals to investment arbitral tribunals.  There is 
a certain degree of forum shopping in the selection of a tribunal, as some 
litigants prefer to have their case heard in the court that they believe is most 
likely to provide a favorable outcome.  Against this background, a number 
of culture-related cases have been adjudicated before international 
economic fora, including investment arbitral tribunals.  International 
disputes relating to the interplay between cultural heritage and economic 
integration require balancing the legitimate cultural policies of a state and 
the legitimate economic interests of investors. 
III. INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AS A FORM OF GLOBAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW 
Investment treaties grant foreign investors direct access to investment 
treaty arbitration.90  Many investment disputes arise from the host state’s 
exertion of public authority.  Arbitral tribunals are given the power to 
review and control this exercise of public authority by settling essentially 
regulatory disputes.91  Investors can claim that a regulatory measure by the 
host state has affected their investment in breach of the relevant investment 
treaty provisions. 
According to some authors, the legal framework provided by the network 
of investment treaties gives substance to the concept of global 
administrative law, or lex administrativa communis,92 defined as “[the] 
process of a global homologation of principles of administrative, 
comparative and international law under different legal systems.”93  
International administrative law is an alternative “dualistic system of 
international law in which countries [may] agree on apolitical matters (e.g., 
international public health and epidemics, defense of international historical 
monuments, or artwork) while maintaining intellectual opposition on other 
issues.”94  International administrative law refers to the former category in 
which common agreement can be more easily reached. 
As Gus Van Harten and Martin Loughlin explain, investment treaty 
 
Matara). Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, PCA-CAP.ORG, http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1151 (last visited Nov. 4, 2014). 
90  Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. (Belg. v. Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 
¶¶ 78-79 (Feb. 5). 
91  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 3. 
92  See generally GLOBAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TOWARDS A LEX ADMINISTRATIVA 
(Javier Robalino-Orellana & Jaime Rodríguez-Arana Muñoz eds., 2010). 
93  Id. at xvii. 
94  Boris N. Mamlyuk & Ugo Mattei, Comparative International Law, 36 BROOK. J. 
INT’L L. 385, 402 (2011) (referring to the work of E.A. KOROVIN, SOVREMENNOE 
MEZHDUNARODNOE PRAVO [CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW] (1926)). 
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arbitration “may in fact offer the only exemplar of global administrative 
law, strictly construed, yet to have emerged.”95  In fact, investment treaty 
arbitration may be conceptualized as a species of global administrative 
review.96  First, arbitral tribunals have an international character because 
their authority derives from treaties.  Second, arbitral tribunals, like 
administrative courts, settle disputes arising from the exercise of public 
authority.97  Third, the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals extends to legal 
disputes.98  Finally, arbitrators borrow key administrative principles that 
guide the conduct of public administrations, such as reasonableness, 
proportionality, procedural fairness, and efficiency as useful parameters for 
evaluating the conduct of states and assessing their compliance with 
relevant investment treaties.99 
However, the conceptualization of investment treaty arbitration as a form 
of global administrative law may prove to be fragile because “the defining 
features of global administrative law are rather fluid.”100  Without a clear 
understanding of what is meant by global administrative law, any attempt to 
classify investment arbitration as such remains a theoretical exercise.  
International law does not have a centralized system of administration; 
rather, states retain their administrative functions.101  Furthermore, “foreign 
investments are usually governed by a series of norms which are not limited 
to (national) administrative law, but include international treaties, customs, 
[and] general principles of law. . . .”102  Arbitral tribunals have also 
expressly rejected being characterized as administrative courts.  For 
instance, in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine, the arbitral tribunal clarified 
that it was an international tribunal, applying international law to a question 
of international responsibility.103  Other cases that confirm this distinction 
 
95  Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of 
Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 121, 122 (2006). 
96  Id. at 123. 
97  Stephan Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order: The Public Function of 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the Role of the Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN 
J. INT’L L. 401, 413 (2010). 
98  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals 
of Other States art. 25, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 (1966) [hereinafter ICSID 
Convention]. 
99  Van Harten & Loughlinn, supra note 95, at 146. 
100  Id. at 122. 
101  Id. at 146. 
102  VADI, PUBLIC HEALTH, supra note 17, at 60. 
103  Generation Ukr., Inc. v. Ukr., ICSID Case No. ARB/00/09, ¶¶ 20.29-20.33, 24.6 
(Sept. 16, 2003), 44 I.L.M. 404 (2005). 
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question the existence of a global administrative law.104 
Finally, the fact that today international investment treaty arbitration 
addresses a diagonal relationship between the host state and foreign 
investors reflects an evolution which is present in other sectors of 
international law, such as human rights law, and not unique to 
administrative review.  Therefore, if this mechanism parallels the local 
judicial review of the courts of the host state, it should not be perceived as a 
substitute of the same, but as a different and additional venue expressly 
provided for by international investment treaties.  The use of the arbitration 
model is aimed at depoliticizing disputes, avoiding potential national court 
bias, and ensuring confidentiality and effective dispute resolution.105  
Historically, foreigners have been considered vulnerable in societies—easy 
objects of reprisal without vote or voice in local political affairs.106  Against 
this background, investment treaties aim to establish a level playing field 
for foreign investors and shield against discrimination and mistreatment by 
the host state.107  Yet, the question remains as to whether investment treaty 
arbitration has become a “sword,” rather than a “shield,” for protecting 
foreign investments.108 
From the analysis in Part III, one might conclude that international 
investment arbitration incorporates some elements of global administrative 
review (i.e., the review of administrative acts), but lacks others.109  The 
administrative acts that are under review in international investment 
arbitration, however, remain in the national sphere.110 
IV. CULTURAL GOVERNANCE BY ARBITRAL TRIBUNALS: THE MAKING OF 
A LEX ADMINISTRATIVA CULTURALIS 
In its multifaceted and protean aspects, the governance of cultural 
 
104  Jorge A. Barraguirre, Los Tratados Bilaterales de Inversión (TBIs) y el Convenio 
CIADI – La Evaporación del Derecho Administrativo Doméstico?, 3 RES. PUBLICA ARG. 
107, 114 (2007). 
105  See Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment 
Disputes: The Role of ICSID and MIGA, 1 AM. U.J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 97, 103 (1986). 
106  See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (2005); Francesco 
Francioni, Access to Justice, Denial of Justice and International Investment Law, 20 EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 729, 730 (2009). 
107  See Ray C. Jones, Commentary, NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-to-State Dispute 
Resolution: A Shield to Be Embraced or a Sword to Be Feared?, 2002 BYU L. REV. 527, 
546 (2002). 
108  See id. at 542. 
109  For a similar conclusion, see Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and 
Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 63 (2013). 
110  Id. 
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heritage can (and has) affect(ed) the economic interests of a number of 
stakeholders, including foreign investors.111  Construction, and similar 
economic activities, can be delayed or forbidden because of archaeological 
excavations.112  Some governments may provide for the compulsory 
acquisition, through purchase or expropriation, of important cultural 
property, thus potentially affecting the economic interests of private actors, 
including foreign investors.113  In addition, excessive heritage protection 
may put an uneven burden on the economic interests of private parties.114  
In fact, foreign investors have brought a number of heritage related claims 
before investment treaty tribunals.115  This Part questions whether the 
adjudication of cultural heritage related to investment disputes contributes 
to the emergence of a lex administrativa culturalis, i.e., a branch of 
transnational law relating to the administration of cultural heritage and 
whether arbitral tribunals impinge on states’ authority over cultural 
governance. 
Over the past few decades, an increasing number of arbitral awards 
relating to cultural heritage have been rendered.116  Have these awards 
contributed to the emergence of customary law or general principles of law, 
i.e., a lex administrativa culturalis?  If so, has this lex administrativa 
culturalis progressively evolved into a transnational legal order that is 
completely autonomous from national and international legal orders, or is it 
intertwined with domestic and international law?  Finally, how does this lex 
administrativa culturalis, a regulatory framework that is based on public 
law, interact with private autonomy? 
Lex administrativa culturalis refers to adjudicator-made cultural law—a 
body of jurisprudence rendered by investment treaty arbitral tribunals that 
adjudicate some cultural heritage issues.117  The argument could be made 
that the existence of a lex administrativa culturalis is a purely intellectual 
exercise that is of limited significance to local communities faced with 
cultural heritage conflicts and the international community in general.118  
At best, a lex administrativa culturalis may be distilled from relevant case 
 
111  Valentina Vadi, Culture Clash? World Heritage and Investors’ Rights in 
International Investment Law and Arbitration, 28 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 
123, 123-24 (2013) [hereinafter Vadi, Culture Clash?]. 
112  See, e.g., S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 32 I.L.M. 933, 937 (1993). 
113  Vadi, Culture Clash?, supra note 111, at 130-31. 
114  Id. at 123-24. 
115  Id. at 133-36. 
116  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14, at 93. 
117  Id. at 294. 
118  Id. 
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law.119  At worst, it is a theoretical construct with no practical impact.120 
Because no apposite cultural heritage courts exist, the jurisprudence of 
investment arbitral tribunals can, and does, impact cultural heritage.121  
This jurisprudence may serve as an unexpected bridge between different 
legal regimes, and as an enforcement mechanism of international cultural 
law.122  For instance, arbitral tribunals have settled disputes concerning 
investments near the pyramids in Egypt and other world heritage sites.123  
Arbitrators have also settled disputes relating to investments in lands that 
are sacred to indigenous peoples,124 or in areas that are related to 
indigenous peoples’ intangible cultural heritage.125  This jurisprudence 
provides some elements from which customary law, and general principles 
of international law, may be drawn.  These underemphasized cases open the 
door to further questions about the objectives and limits of international 
investment law, the unity or fragmentation of international law, and 
international cultural law’s effectiveness. 
Determining the existence of a lex administrativa culturalis, or the 
emergence of general principles of international law that require the 
protection of cultural heritage in times of peace, is a theoretical endeavor 
with significant practical implications.126  Although a number of scholars 
have studied the protection of cultural heritage in wartime,127 the existence 
of a lex administrativa culturalis in peacetime has not received similar 
attention.  In international law, the distinction between wartime and 
peacetime is relevant to determining the applicability of certain legal 
norms.128  Ascertaining the existence of general principles that require the 
protection of cultural heritage, even in peacetime, would be significant in 
 
119  The choice whether or not to create an international cultural heritage court is a 
complex institutional choice that states confront. See generally Suzanne Katzenstein, In the 
Shadow of Crisis: The Creation of International Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 151 (2014) (discussing the creation of international courts and tribunals). 
120  Id. 
121  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14, at 240. 
122  See, e.g., Vadi, Culture Clash?, supra note 111, at 126. 
123  See id. at 133-34. 
124  See Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award, ¶ 834 (June 8, 2009), 48 
I.L.M. 1035. 
125  See Grand River Enter. Six Nations Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL/NAFTA 
Chapter 11, Award, (Jan. 12, 2011). 
126  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 2. 
127  See, e.g., ROGER O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED 
CONFLICT (2006). 
128  Valentina Vadi, War, Memory, and Culture: The Uncertain Legal Status of Historic 
Sunken Warships Under International Law, 37 TUL. MAR. L.J. 333, 336 n.20 (2012-2013). 
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the development of customary international law.  Such principles would 
bind states without regard to their adhesion to certain treaties,129 facilitating 
the consideration of cultural heritage in the adjudication of international 
disputes.130  This in turn would assist adjudicators in settling cultural 
heritage related disputes, thus enhancing the predictability of those 
adjudicators’ decisions and reinforcing the perceived legitimacy of their 
rulings.131  Additionally, the scrutiny of certain arbitrations may aid in 
ascertaining whether the current legal framework provides adequate 
protection to cultural heritage or whether amendments may be advisable.  
More importantly, the question remains as to whether arbitral tribunals are 
the best fora for balancing the public and private interests in cultural 
heritage governance as their mandate derives from investment treaties 
rather than cultural treaties. 
This Part is divided into three sections.  Part IV.A examines the ways in 
which a lex administrativa culturalis is distinct from or comparable to other 
legal frameworks (e.g., the lex mercatoria).  Part IV.B investigates whether 
arbitrators contribute to the coalescence of a lex administrativa culturalis.  
Finally, Part IV.C illustrates how the concept of a lex administrativa 
culturalis assists in understanding the interplay between cultural interests 
and investor rights.  Specifically, Part IV.C elaborates on the concepts of 
cultural governance and good cultural governance. 
A.  Merchants, Sailors, Investors, and Athletes: Commonalities and 
Differences 
The term lex administrativa culturalis brings to mind other well-known 
formulations: lex maritima,132 lex mercatoria,133 lex mercatoria publica,134 
 
129  VADI, CULTURAL HERITAGE, supra note 14, at 295. 
130  See Vadi, Culture Clash?, supra note 111, at 131. 
131  Valentina Vadi, When Cultures Collide: Foreign Direct Investment, Natural 
Resources, Indigenous Heritage in International Investment Law, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 797, 883 (2011) [hereinafter Vadi, When Cultures Collide]. 
132  See, e.g., William Tetley, Maritime Law as a Mixed Legal System (With 
Particular Reference to the Distinctive Nature of American Maritime Law, Which 
Benefits from Both Its Civil and Common Law Heritages), 23 TUL. MAR. L.J. 317, 319-21 
(1999); William Tetley, The General Maritime Law – The Lex Maritima, 20 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L. L. & COM. 105, 109 (1994) [hereinafter Tetley, The General Maritime Law]. 
133  See, e.g., Philippe Kahn, La lex mercatoria et son destin [The lex mercatoria and Its 
Fate], in L’ACTUALITÉ DE LA PENSÉE DE BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, DROIT COMMERCIAL, 
INTERNATIONAL ET EUROPÉEN [THE CURRENT THOUGHT OF BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL LAW] 25 (Philippe Fouchard & Louis Vogel 
eds., 2004). 
134  Stephan Schill, Transnational Private-Public Arbitration as Global Regulatory 
VADI - GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/23/15  4:37 PM 
2015] GLOBAL CULTURAL GOVERNANCE 123 
 
lex petrolea,135 and lex sportiva.136  This section briefly examines each of 
these concepts and compares them to the idea of a lex administrativa 
culturalis.  Additionally, a number of formulations have been used to 
indicate additional emerging areas of law, including lex pacificatoria, lex 
electronica, and lex constructionis.137  A more detailed description of these 
newer formulations is not within the scope of this Article. 
1. Lex Maritima 
The lex maritima, or general maritime law, has been defined as the 
“oldest form of Jus Gentium or the law of nations still substantially extant 
and practiced today.”138  The rules governing shipping and maritime trade 
have developed transnationally over a number of centuries.139  Those rules 
were based on the practices and customs of merchants and were developed 
by admiralty or merchant courts set up along trade routes.140  These courts, 
irrespective of nationality, “covered the same kinds of disputes and 
 
Governance: Charting and Codifying the Lex Mercatoria Publica, MAX PLANCK INST. FOR 
COMPARATIVE PUB. LAW AND INT’L LAW, 
http://www.mpil.de/en/pub/organization/lex_mp.cfm (last visited Jan. 28, 2015). 
135  See generally R. Doak Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: 
The Development of a Lex Petrolea, XXIII Y.B. COM. ARB. 1131 (1998); Thomas C.C. 
Childs, Update on Lex Petrolea: The Continuing Development of Customary Law Relating to 
International Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, 4 J. WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 214, 
214, 259 (2011). 
136  See, e.g., FRANCK LATTY, LA LEX SPORTIVA, RECHERCHE SUR LE DROIT 
TRANSNATIONAL [THE LEX SPORTIVA, RESEARCH ON TRANSNATIONAL LAW] (2007); LEX 
SPORTIVA. WHAT IS SPORTS LAW? (Robert C.R. Siekman & Janwillem Soek eds., 2012); 
Lorenzo Casini, The Making of a Lex Sportiva by the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 12 GER. 
L.J. 1317, 1319 (2011); Antoine Duval, Lex Sportiva: A Playground for Transnational Law, 
19 EUR. L.J. 822, 822-42 (2013). 
137  The lex pacificatoria refers to the “dialectical interaction of international law and 
the practice of peacemakers.” See Christine Bell, Of Jus Post Bellum and Lex Pacificatoria – 
What’s in a Name?, in IUS POST BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 181, 182 
(Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S. Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014). The lex electronica or 
cyber law governs Internet activities. See Pierre Trudel, La Lex Electronica, in LE DROIT 
SAISI PAR LA MONDIALISATION 1, 2 (Charles-Albert Morand ed., 2001). The lex constructionis 
includes the application of international rules of construction contracts in arbitration. See, 
e.g., Camilo Armando Franco Leguízamo, De la Lex Mercatoria a la Lex Constructionis, 6 
REVIST@ E–MERCATORIA 1, 17-19 (2007); Charles Molineaux, Moving Toward a 
Construction Lex Mercatoria, A Lex Constructionis 14 J. INT’L ARB. 55, 64 (1997). 
138  Kevin J. Christensen, Of Comity: Aerospatiale as Lex Maritima, 2 LOY. MAR. L.J. 
1, 1 (2003). 
139  Id. 
140  Id. at 2-3. 
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exercised the same kind of international jurisdiction.”141  The judge-made 
lex maritima, which arguably developed parallel to the lex mercatoria, 
fused national law and current international conventions.142  Today, 
maritime arbitration remains as the principal choice for settling shipping 
disputes and is developing an ius commune which is evident in a number of 
reported awards.143  One common feature of the lex maritima and the lex 
administrativa culturalis is that they are both enforced by specialized 
bodies that were established to cope with the needs of traders and investors.  
Yet they differ in that lex maritima refers to a private law system that 
regulates shipping between private actors, and lex administrativa culturalis 
regulates the interplay between foreign investors and the host state. 
2. Lex Mercatoria 
Historically, the term lex mercatoria, or merchant law, refers to the body 
of commercial rules, customs, and best practices used by merchants during 
the medieval and Renaissance period, enforced through a system of 
merchant courts along important trade routes.144  Some authors now 
contend that a new merchant law has arisen to facilitate the needs of 
international commercial actors.145  The existence of a modern lex 
mercatoria has been challenged on the ground that private contracts remain 
governed by national laws.146  Yet, some scholars contend that this “‘new 
new lex mercatoria’” has moved “from an amorphous and flexible soft law 
to an established system of law with codified legal rules (first and foremost 
the UNIDROIT Principles of International and Commercial Law) and 
strongly institutionalized court-like international arbitration.”147  Whether 
the current lex mercatoria may truly be compared to the medieval lex 
 
141  Id. at 1 n.6. 
142  See Tetley, The General Maritime Law, supra note 132, 133-34. 
143  See Buffy D. Lord, Dispute Resolution on the High Seas: Aspects of Maritime 
Arbitration, 8 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 71, 72 (2002); Tetley, The General Maritime Law, 
supra note 132, at 107. 
 144  Ralph Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law beyond the State, 14 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 448 (2007). 
145  Gilles Cuniberti, Three Theories of Lex Mercatoria, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 
369, 371 (2013). For pioneering work, see Berthold Goldman, La lex mercatoria dans les 
contrats et l’arbitrage internationaux: réalité et perspectives [The Lex Mercatoria in 
International Contracts and Arbitration: Reality and Prospects], 106 J. DROIT INT’L 475, 
499 (1979). 
146  See, e.g., Symeon Symeonides, Party Autonomy and Private-Law Making in Private 
International Law: The Lex Mercatoria that Isn’t, in LIBER AMICORUM K. KERAMEUS 1379 
(2009). 
147  Michaels, supra note 144, at 448 (citations omitted). 
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mercatoria remains disputed.148  Much like the lex maritima, and the lex 
administrativa culturalis, the lex mercatoria in both its historical and 
current formulations is also enforced by specialized bodies that have been 
established for the benefit of traders and investors.  The lex mercatoria 
differs from the lex administrativa culturalis in that the former represents a 
private legal system that regulates commerce between private actors.  The 
lex administrativa culturalis, on the other hand, governs interactions 
between foreign investors and the host state.149 
3. Lex Mercatoria Publica 
The lex mercatoria publica is an innovative concept developed by 
Stephan Schill to examine “the rising phenomenon of transnational 
arbitrations between private economic actors and public law bodies 
(private-public arbitrations) as a mechanism of global regulatory 
governance.”150  Schill “hypothesizes that arbitrators themselves exercise 
public authority, mainly in two regards: first, by reviewing government acts 
as to their legality, and second, by incrementally making the rules that 
govern public-private relations.”151  How does the lex administrativa 
culturalis relate to this new lex mercatoria publica concept?  Both fields are 
characterized by the prominence of private actors in the global arena and by 
internationalized and privatized dispute settlement mechanisms.  
Additionally, both raise important questions with regard to the legitimacy of 
the investor-state arbitration.  As Schill points out, there is a risk that 
arbitrators “redefine through their dispute settlement activity the 
relationship between private rights and public interests and bypass public 
policy choices made by democratically elected public authorities.”152 The 
principal difference between the two concepts is that the lex administrativa 
culturalis is more specific in that it concerns those arbitral awards that 
relate to cultural heritage.  One could even argue that the lex administrativa 
culturalis is but a part of the lex mercatoria publica.  In fact, both are 
“means by which international law harnesses and guides national 
administrative” decisions.153  At the same time, however, they raise 
important concerns of legitimacy. 
 
148  Cuniberti, supra note 145, at 379. 
149  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 3. 
150  Schill, supra note 134. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Joel P. Trachtman, International Legal Control of Domestic Administrative Action, 
17 J. INT’L ECON. L. 753, 753 (2014). 
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4. Lex Petrolea 
The expression lex petrolea was used by the state party in the Aminoil 
arbitration154 to refer to a set of awards that stemmed from a series of 
nationalizations of oil concessions in the 1970s.155  Although those awards 
did not embody “a mature set of legal regulations,” they constituted “the 
beginnings of a lex petrolea” to govern the international petroleum 
industry.156  More recent awards “address a sufficiently wide range of 
issues to create a ‘lex petrolea’ or customary law comprising legal rules 
adapted to the industry’s nature and specificities.”157  Like lex petrolea, the 
lex administrativa culturalis develops through arbitral awards in investment 
treaty arbitrations, and reflects the balance between public and private 
interests in the administration of limited resources, such as cultural assets.  
It is not a coincidence that art and cultural heritage have been defined as the 
“oil” of some countries in emphasizing the associated benefits that are 
derived from the good governance of cultural resources in terms of 
economic growth and societal wellbeing.158  Depending on the applicable 
law, both lex petrolea and lex administrativa culturalis may incorporate 
elements of national and international law.159  Yet, the two differ in their 
objectives.  Furthermore, while the adjudication of oil-related disputes 
provides a specific, direct cause of action in investment arbitration, cultural 
heritage is often involved indirectly in investment disputes. 
5. Lex Sportiva 
Lex sportiva refers to judge-made law developed by the Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”).160  The CAS is a highly specialized forum 
 
154  Gov’t of the State of Kuwait v. Am. Indep. Oil Co., 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982). 
155  Id. 
156  Bishop, supra note 135, at 1131. 
157  Childs, supra note 135, at 259. 
158  Fiona Ehlers, Temple for Rent: Italy Hopes Sponsoring Can Save Cultural 
Treasures, SPIEGEL, Apr. 18, 2012, http://www.spiegel.de/international/zeitgeist/italy-turns-
to-sponsors-to-save-its-cultural-sites-a-828256.html (“Culture is Italy’s natural resource, 
almost like oil for the Middle East.”); see also Who pays the Bill for Italy’s Cultural 
Heritage?, EURONEWS, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2013/02/01/who-pays-the-
bill-for-italy-s-cultural-heritage (“Italy has no natural oil wealth but an [sic] historical and 
cultural resource fashioned through 28 centuries of an unbroken civilisation.”). 
159  In some investment arbitrations, the applicable law is the law of the host state; in 
others, it is that of the host state and other applicable rules of international law. See, e.g., 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Convention on the Settlement of 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States art. 42, June 10, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 
1270. 
160  Louise Reilly, Introduction to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) and the Role 
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where sport-related disputes “[may] be heard and decided, quickly and 
inexpensively, according to a flexible procedure.”161  CAS jurisprudence 
includes general principles of sports law,162 such as good governance, 
procedural fairness, and equitable treatment.163  The lex sportiva constitutes 
“a transnational autonomous private order . . . created by international 
sporting federations [on] a . . . contractual basis[;] and its legitimacy comes 
from voluntary agreement or submission to the jurisdiction of sporting 
federations by athletes and others who come under its jurisdiction.”164  Lex 
administrativa culturalis and lex sportiva have a few commonalities.  Both 
are developed by highly specialized arbitral tribunals.  Additionally, both 
treaty arbitral tribunals and “CAS panels rely heavily on previous arbitral 
awards in reaching their decisions.”165  Both bodies of jurisprudence have 
also raised certain concerns with regard to their human rights 
implications.166  Further, overlap between lex sportiva and international 
investment law may exist where certain activities of sports federations are 
deemed to be “investments.”167  However, there are important differences 
between the lex sportiva and the lex administrativa culturalis: the lex 
sportiva is a purely private order, while investment treaty arbitration has 
 
of National Courts in International Sports Disputes, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 63, 75 (2012). 
161  Id. at 63. 
162  Ken Foster, Lex Sportiva and Lex Ludica: The Court of Arbitration for Sport’s 
Jurisprudence, 3 ENT. & SPORTS L.J. 1 (2006). 
163  Id. 
164  Id. at 2. 
165  Although there is no rule of binding precedent in international law, arbitral tribunals 
demonstrate a consistent deference to prior awards, tending to follow prior jurisprudence. 
With regard to CAS panels, see, e.g., Annie Bersagel, Is There a Stare Decisis Doctrine in 
the Court of Arbitration for Sport?, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 189, 189 (2012). With regard 
to investment treaty tribunals, see, e.g., Andrea K. Bjorklund, Investment Treaty Arbitral 
Decisions as Jurisprudence Constante, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND 
FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE 265 (Colin Picker, Isabella Bunn & Douglas W. Arner eds., 
2008); Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or Excuse?, 23 
ARB. INT’L 357, 364 (2007). 
166  Clara Reiner & Christoph Schreuer, Human Rights and International Investment 
Arbitration, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBITRATION 82 
(Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Francesco Francioni & Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 2008); James 
A.R. Nafziger, Lex Sportiva, INT’L SPORTS L.J. 3, 3, 14 (2004). 
167  See Franck Latty, Compétition sportive et droit des investissements. Quelques 
élucubrations juridiques à l’approche de la Coupe du monde de football au Brésil et des 
Jeux olympiques de Rio de Janeiro, 1 VI ANUÁRIO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL 
[BRAZILIAN Y.B. INT’L LAW] 149-69 (2011); Robert A. Schmoll, Note, NAFTA Chapter 11 
and Professional Sports in Canada, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 1027 (2003). 
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public law features.168  Furthermore, while the lex sportiva seems to have 
developed relatively autonomous rules, and the jurisdiction of the CAS is 
based on contract, the lex administrativa culturalis is a creature of 
international law in which international treaties establish investment arbitral 
tribunals.169 
B. The Makers of a Lex Administrativa Culturalis 
This section explores the identities of investment arbitrators and their 
role in investment arbitration.  In investor-state arbitration, the parties to the 
dispute select a single or uneven number of arbitrator(s).170  Arbitrators are 
required to be neutral and impartial.171  Although “[t]he rationale 
underlying international judicial appointments remains mostly implicit in 
both the legal and political science literatures,”172 sociological factors 
matter when one scrutinizes whether the parties take advantage of the 
freedom offered to them, and how.173  Parties perceive the selection of their 
own arbitrator as an advantage.174 
In general terms, arbitrators are usually experts in international law, 
international trade, or dispute resolution.175  For instance, NAFTA 
“[p]anelists are chosen from rosters of experts established by the Parties in 
 
168  But see Carmen Pérez González, International Sports Law and the Fight Against 
Doping: An Analysis from an International Human Rights Law Perspective 2, 15 (Eur. Soc’y 
Int’l Law, 10th Anniversary Conference, Vienna, Conference Paper No. 5/2014, 2014), 
available at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2546141 (stressing the need 
for “the application of the fundamental principles of public law” to sports activity). 
169  See generally Nafziger, supra note 166; Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa 
Culturalis?, supra note 19. 
170  ICSID Convention, supra note 98, art. 37.  For commentary, see Antonio Parra, The 
Development of the Regulations and Rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, 41 INT’L L. 47 (2007). 
171  ICSID Convention, supra note 98, art. 14. 
172  Eric Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
387, 391 (2008-2009). 
173  Aleksander Goldštajn, Choice of International Arbitrators, Arbitral Tribunals and 
Centres: Legal and Sociological Aspects, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 31 (Peter Šarčević, ed., 1989). 
174  See William W. Park, Arbitrator Integrity, in THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT 
ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 189-251 (Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-
Hwa Liz Chung & Claire Balchin eds., 2010). 
175  Valentina Vadi, Socio-Legal Perspectives on the Adjudication of Cultural Diversity 
Disputes in International Economic Disputes 17 (Oñati Int’l Inst. for the Sociology of Law, 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Working Paper No. 4, 2011) [hereinafter Vadi, Socio-Legal 
Perspectives]. 
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each NAFTA country.”176  Panelists must have good character, be objective 
and reliable, and have sound judgment and general familiarity with 
international trade law.177  The majority of the members of a panel, 
including the Chair, must be lawyers,”178 albeit non-lawyers, including two 
architects, have been appointed to a few tribunals.179  Although there is no 
requirement for arbitrators to have experience that is relevant to the 
particular subject matter of the dispute, a legal background is common 
among investment arbitrators.180  “Expertise in public international law, or 
constitutional and administrative law, [as well as commercial law,] is a 
common feature in the arbitrator’s profile.”181  Indeed, most arbitrators 
have been professors of public international law or administrative law, or 
judges in other international fora, including the ICJ and regional human 
rights courts.182  This feature is of relevance because it may informally 
promote the coherence of international law.183  Arbitrators tend to be a 
relatively homogenous group.184  Usually, they are “exceptionally talented 
 
176  NAFTA Secretariat, Frequently Asked Questions (May 11, 2014), 
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Resources/Frequently-Asked-Questions. 
177  Id. 
178  Id. 
179  Sergio Puig, Social Capital in the Arbitration Market, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 387, 397 
(2014) (“While mostly lawyers act as arbitrators, non-lawyers, including two architects, two 
maritime experts, and one economist, have been appointed in a few instances.”). 
180  José Augusto Fontoura Costa, Comparing WTO Panelists and ICSID Arbitrators: 
The Creation of International Legal Fields 15 (Oñati Int’l Inst. for the Sociology of Law, 
Oñati Socio-Legal Series, Working Paper No. 4, 2011) (“Virtually all ICSID arbitrators and 
ad hoc committee members have some legal background, since only 0.4% of the whole 
population is of individuals who had not at least studied law.”). 
181  Vadi, Socio-Legal Perspectives, supra note 175, at 17; see Stephan Schill, W(h)ither 
Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. 
INT’L LAW 875, 888 (2011) (“[I]nternational investment law is . . . characterized by . . . a 
division of epistemic communities along different lines, namely those joining the field from 
private commercial law and arbitration, and those coming from public international law and 
inter-state dispute settlement.”). 
182  Schill, supra note 181, at 889 (“[T]he legitimating discourse is centered on the 
image of arbitrators who are highly technically prepared, who have outstanding careers as 
professors and lawyers, though sometimes also having some former experience in public 
affairs.”). 
183  Valentina Vadi, Critical Comparisons: The Role of Comparative Law in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 67, 88 (2010). 
184  Authors have pointed out the inadequate representation of developing countries. 
Michael Weibel et al., The Backlash against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and 
Reality, in THE BLACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY 
xl (Michael Weibel et al. eds., 2010). 
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individuals [who] speak multiple languages”185 and have studied at 
prestigious universities,186 exercised the legal profession, or taught in two 
or more jurisdictions and are therefore exposed to more than one legal 
culture.187  The fact that these arbitrators are not rooted in a single country 
also makes them less susceptible to national influences.188 
Some studies have analyzed arbitrators’ judicial patterns through an 
economic lens, theorizing that as utility maximizers, arbitrators may have 
an economic incentive to rule in favor of prospective claimants (i.e., foreign 
companies) to “increase their chances of reappointment in future 
disputes. . . .”189  To counter the appearance of bias, some authors have 
proposed the establishment of a World Investment Court,190 or that every 
arbitrator “should be chosen jointly or selected by a neutral body.”191  
Nonetheless, recent empirical studies based on statistical analysis have 
shown “no tendency [of] any group of arbitrators . . . to rule in favour of 
investors.”192  Authors have stressed that the arbitrators’ valuable 
professional reputation is a key incentive for them to be impartial.193 
Critical theorists suggest that arbitration is a “technocratic mechanism of 
dispute settlement.”194  Accordingly, the internationalization of given 
disputes would constitute a form of imperialism where transnational elites 
support globalization and disempower national governance.195  This 
criticism is frequently brought against international dispute settlement 
mechanisms.  The internationalization of given disputes, however, does not 
necessarily entail a disempowerment of the state: it can also reinforce its 
 
185  Catherine Rogers, The Vocation of the International Arbitrator, 20 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 957, 958 (2004-2005). 
186  YVES DEZALAY & BRYAN GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 18-
21 (1996). 
187  Id. at 21. 
188  Valentina Vadi, The Cultural Wealth of Nations in International Law, 21 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 87, 93 (2012-2013). 
189  Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor – Exploring Decision Patterns of 
Elite Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 49 (2010). 
190  GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 152-84 
(2007). 
191  Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. – 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 339, 352 (2010). 
192  Kapeliuk, supra note 189, at 90; see also Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes 
of Investor-State Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 435-89 (2009). 
193  Kapeliuk, supra note 189, at 90. 
194  Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing Bias 
Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 430 (2000). 
195  Puig, supra note 179, at 389 (reporting this criticism). 
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policies in given sectors.  Moreover, some scholars suggest that a 
recalibration of the system is taking place, as claims have been brought 
against both developing and industrialized states.196  In addition, investment 
treaties have also started to include a more comprehensive language so as to 
include reference to non-economic values.197 
Can the background of arbitrators affect their responsiveness to other 
branches of international law in the settlement of investment disputes?  
Some scholars have examined how social factors can affect the constitution 
of arbitral tribunals and their decision-making processes.198  Moshe Hirsch, 
for instance, has found that “the socio-cultural distance between the 
particular branches of international law affects the inclination of relevant 
decision-makers to incorporate, or reject, legal rules developed in other 
branches of international law.”199  On the other hand, the background of 
some arbitrators in international law may facilitate a positive appreciation 
of the same legal rules in investment treaty arbitration.200  In turn, this 
might overcome any perceived “superiority complex” vis-à-vis other 
branches of international law.201 
Several arbitral tribunals have settled cultural diversity related disputes in 
a dynamic fashion.202  Other tribunals, however, have adopted a more 
restrictive approach to the relevance of cultural heritage law in the context 
of arbitration.203  One may wonder whether the fact that renowned 
professors of public international law sat on the more dynamic tribunals, 
while commercial law experts sat on the more restrictive tribunals, had any 
impact on the final outcome.204 
Analyzing the arbitrators’ patterns through a socio-legal lens may lead to 
 
196  Roberts, supra note 109, at 78. 
197  Id. at 82. 
198  Puig, supra note 179, at 387 (assessing the social structure of investor-state 
arbitrators). 
199  Moshe Hirsch, The Sociology of International Investment Law, in THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE 143, 
144 (Zachary Douglas, Joost Pauwelyn & Jorge Viñuales eds., 2014). 
200  Id. at 165. 
201  Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Compassion or Superiority Complex?: What to Make of the 
WTO Waiver for “Conflict Diamonds,” 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1177, 1177 (2003) (elaborating 
on the notion of institutional superiority complex vis-à-vis other international organizations). 
202  See, e.g., Glamis Gold Ltd. v. United States, ICSID, Award, ¶ 834 (June 8, 2009), 
48 I.L.M. 1035; Grand River Enter. Six Nations Ltd. v. United States, UNCITRAL/NAFTA 
Chapter 11, Award (Jan. 12, 2011). 
203  Vadi, Socio-Legal Perspectives, supra note 175, at 18. 
204  Roberts, supra note 109, at 53 (“[O]ne’s interests and background often influence 
one’s choice of analogy.”). 
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nuanced outcomes. Socio-legal studies perceive “law [as] a social 
product—a complex of activities of real people with socially shared and 
produced, but individually carried out, . . . ideas, beliefs, motivations and 
purposes.”205  Certainly, arbitrators have cultural capital that encompasses a 
set of attitudes, knowledge, and language, as well as the structural 
constraints within which international lawyers live and work.206  Arguably, 
the background of arbitrators influences their cognitive framework, 
heuristics, and legal reasoning.207  While intuitively socio-legal factors that 
characterize the composition and the selection process of investment 
tribunals matter, the question as to whether the cultural capital of some 
arbitrators leads to “better” settlements of cultural diversity related disputes 
remains open.  Whether and how sociological factors impact the final 
outcome of the arbitral process remains immeasurable.  Broad judgments 
cannot be made about the adjudicators in either context based on a review 
of a limited number of cases.  In this regard, further research is needed. 
C. Good Cultural Governance 
The review by an international tribunal of domestic regulations can 
improve good cultural governance and the transparent pursuit of legitimate 
cultural policies.208  Cultural governance refers to the need to regulate 
human activities, and their implications on cultural heritage and protect the 
cultural interests of present and future generations.  It entails a number of 
legislative, executive, and administrative functions.209  Good cultural 
governance refers to the exercise of state authority according to due process 
and the rule of law, which includes respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.210  In fact, the growing importance of arbitral 
tribunals may compel governments to consider the impact of regulations, 
including cultural policies, on foreign investors and their investments 
before the enactment of such measures to avoid potential claims and 
subsequent liability.211  If a foreign investment is expropriated, whether 
 
205  Vadi, Socio-Legal Perspectives, supra note 175, at 18 (citing Brian Tamanaha, A 
Holistic Vision of the Socio-Legal Terrain, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 89-90 (2008)). 
206  MARTII KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870-1960 2 (2001). 
207  Vadi, Socio-Legal Perspectives, supra note 175, at 18. 
208  Anél A. Du Plessis & Christa Rautenbach, Legal Perspectives on the Role of 
Culture in Sustainable Development, 13 POTCHEFSTROOM ELEC. L.J. 27, 55 (2010). 
209  Id. at 46. 
210  Id. at 48, 62. 
211  Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of 
States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 297 (2013). 
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directly or indirectly, compensation must be paid.212  While states are free 
to adopt zoning measures, they must treat foreign companies fairly and 
equitably.213  However, regulatory distinctions based on the protection of 
cultural heritage do not constitute discrimination.214 
While each state retains the right to regulate within its own territory, 
international law poses vertical constraints on this right, “introducing global 
interests into the decision-making processes of domestic authorities. . . .”215  
Adherence to these international regimes “add[s] a circuit of ‘external 
accountability,’ forcing domestic authorities to consider the interests of the 
wider global constituency affected by their decisions.”216  At the same time, 
the internal accountability of state authorities to their own domestic 
constituencies does not cease to exist.217  Domestic law is not replaced by 
international law; rather, it becomes permeable with respect to international 
law.218  International investment rules can also “bring about change in 
domestic governance institutions and practices.”219 
In the specific context of cultural disputes, the boundaries between global 
and local become blurred.  When adjudicating disputes relating to cultural 
heritage, arbitrators have to deal with a complex mixture of international 
investment law, national law, and cultural heritage law.  Recent arbitrations 
have shown that arbitrators are taking cultural elements into account when 
adjudicating such disputes.  The administrative acts under review belong to 
the national sphere, but they implement norms of an international character 
 
212  Marion & Reinhard Unglaube v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/20, Award, ¶ 332.2 (May 16, 2012) (with regard to indirect expropriation); 
Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica [Development 
Company of Santa Elena S.A..], ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Award (Feb. 17, 2000), (with 
regard to direct expropriation). 
213  MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. & MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/7, Award, ¶ 166 (May 25, 2004). 
214  Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, ¶ 332 (Sept. 11, 2007) (“It is each State’s undeniable right and privilege to exercise 
its sovereign legislative power. . . . Save for the existence of an agreement, in the form of a 
stabilization clause or otherwise, there is nothing objectionable about the amendment 
brought to the regulatory framework existing at the time an investor made its investment.”). 
215  Stefano Battini, The Procedural Side of Legal Globalization: The Case of the World 
Heritage Convention, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 340, 343 (2011). 
216  Id. at 364. 
217  Id. 
218  Id. at 366. 
219  Mavluda Sattorova, International Investment Treaties and the Promise of Good 
Governance: Norm and Institutional Design, Internalisation, and Domestic Rule-Making 3 
(Eur. Soc’y Int’l Law, 10th Anniversary Conference, Vienna, Conference Paper No. 
11/2014, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2546404. 
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(e.g., UNESCO conventions).  Therefore, the theory that investment 
arbitration may constitute a form of global administrative review becomes 
more plausible. 
If investment treaty arbitrations constitute a form of global administrative 
review, the existence of a discrete number of cultural heritage related 
arbitrations tests the hypothesis of the coalescence of a lex administrativa 
culturalis as an archetype of global administrative law.  Cultural law can be 
conceived as a species of administrative law, i.e., the body of law that 
governs the activities of administrative agencies of governments in the 
cultural sector.  Executive organs, such as the World Heritage Committee, 
bring to mind a centralized system of administration.  While states retain 
control over administrative matters, cultural matters no longer lie within 
their domain reservé.  World heritage sites are emblematic of regulatory 
pluralism, in which public administrations need to comply with multiple 
international norms, i.e., the World Heritage Convention, its guidelines, and 
the indications of the World Heritage Committee.  In monist systems, these 
rules are immediately effective and can be applied by a domestic judge.  In 
dualist systems, these international norms need to be translated into national 
law, but they do not lose their international origin.  While arbitral tribunals 
have denied being administrative courts,220 de facto, they exercise 
international public law by reviewing national measures to assess their 
compliance with relevant investment treaties. 
Like other international adjudicative bodies,221 arbitral tribunals are not 
to undertake a de novo review of the evidence once brought before the 
national authorities, merely repeating the fact-finding conducted by those 
authorities.222  It is not appropriate for arbitral tribunals to “second-guess 
the correctness of the . . . decision-making of highly specialized national 
regulatory agencies.”223  For instance, in Glamis Gold, the arbitral tribunal 
adopted a high standard of review, according deference to the federal and 
state legislative measures aimed at protecting indigenous cultural 
heritage.224  The arbitral tribunal recognized that “[i]t is not the role of this 
Tribunal or any international tribunal, to supplant its own judgment of 
underlying factual material and support for that of a qualified domestic 
 
220  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 14. 
221  See, e.g., Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (DSU) art. 11, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 2, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994). 
222  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 16. 
223  Chemtura Corp. (formerly Crompton Corp.) v. Canada, Ad Hoc NAFTA 
Arbitration, Award, ¶ 134 (Aug. 2, 2010). 
224  Vadi, Toward a Lex Administrativa Culturalis?, supra note 19, at 16. 
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agency,”225 and that “governments must compromise between the interests 
of competing parties.”226 
On the other hand, arbitral tribunals scrutinize national measures to 
ascertain their compliance with host state investment law obligations.  
Thus, arbitral tribunals are not to pay total deference before national 
cultural policies, and simply accept the determinations of the relevant 
national authorities as final.  Rather, they assess whether or not the 
competent authorities have complied with their international investment law 
obligations in making their determinations.  For instance, in S. Pac. Prop. 
(Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (the “Egyptian Pyramids 
Case”), which involved the denial of a construction project in front of the 
Pyramids for understandable cultural reasons, loss of profits was not 
awarded due to the unlawfulness of the proposed economic activity under 
cultural heritage law.227  Notwithstanding the previous approval of the 
investment at stake, Egypt cancelled the contract, and the area was added to 
the World Heritage List.228  The ICSID tribunal noted that it had been 
added to the list after the cancellation of the project.229  Therefore, it found 
contractual liability and sustained the claimants’ argument that the 
particular public purpose of the expropriation could not change the 
obligation to pay fair compensation.230 However, it reduced the amount of 
the award (or payment), stating that only the actual damage (damnum 
emergens), and not the loss of profit (lucrum cessans), could be 
compensated.231  Indeed, it stated: “[S]ales in the areas registered with the 
World Heritage Committee under the UNESCO Convention would have 
been illegal under . . . international law and . . .  the allowance of lucrum 
cessans may only involve those profits which are legitimate.”232 
Therefore, it will be important for the states to show that their regulations 
aim to achieve legitimate public goals and that they follow due process of 
law.  As one arbitral tribunal held, 
“public interest” requires some genuine interest of the public. If mere 
reference to “public interest” can magically [create] such interest . . . 
and therefore satisfy this requirement, then this requirement would be 
 
225  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, Award, ¶ 779 (June 8, 2009), 48 I.L.M. 1035. 
226  Id. ¶ 803. 
227  S. Pac. Prop. (Middle East) Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3, Award (May 20, 1992), 32 I.L.M. 933, 974 (1993). 
228  Id. at 966. 
229  Id. 
230  Id. at 972. 
231  Id. at 973. 
232  Id. 
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rendered meaningless since the Tribunal can imagine no situation 
where this requirement would not have been met.233 
That being said, the review of cultural heritage related disputes by 
arbitral tribunals could also jeopardize the protection of cultural heritage.234  
At the end of the day, the protection of cultural heritage is not listed among 
the objectives of investment treaties.  Arbitrators have a limited mandate, 
and may not have adequate expertise to deal with cultural heritage.  
Scholars have pointed out that good governance can be a patronizing 
concept.235  For instance, Kate Miles has argued that “the current framing 
of investor-state arbitration as the embodiment of good governance and the 
rule of law is representative solely of the perspective of political and private 
elites.”236  Miles adds that “it will remain so without the incorporation of 
substantive principles from other areas of international law. . . .”237  Finally, 
whether investment treaty arbitration may cause a regulatory chill is also up 
for debate.238 
CONCLUSION 
Cultural governance has come of age, and is a good example of legal 
pluralism and multilevel governance.  The governance of cultural heritage 
raises important political, legal, and economic conflicts among different 
actors at different levels.  The connection between cultural heritage law and 
international investment law has also become important.  Investment 
treaties provide extensive protection for investors to encourage foreign 
direct investment and promote the economic development of host states.  
Tension exists when a state adopts cultural policies that interfere with 
foreign investment because such policies may breach investment treaty 
provisions.  Additionally, investment treaties offer direct access for 
investors to an international arbitral tribunal where they may seek 
compensation for the adverse impact of cultural regulations on their 
businesses. 
Because international cultural treaties do not include compulsory dispute 
 
233  ADC Affiliate Ltd. & ADC & ADMC Management Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., 
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(Chester Brown & Kate Miles eds., 2011). 
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resolution mechanisms, cultural heritage related disputes have been 
adjudicated by international arbitral tribunals, which are highly effective 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  The availability of arbitral tribunals has 
been a mixed blessing.  On the one hand, cultural heritage related 
investment arbitrations test the effectiveness of cultural governance given 
the lack of permanent heritage tribunals.  On the other hand, concerns 
remain with regard to the efficacy of cultural governance because arbitral 
tribunals have a limited mandate and cannot adjudicate violations of 
international cultural law.  Thus, socio-legal aspects—that certain 
arbitrators, for instance, are not experts in public international law—may be 
of limited relevance. 
Can the global administrative review of substantive domestic regulations 
improve good governance and the transparent pursuit of legitimate cultural 
policies?  Are arbitral tribunals promoting good cultural governance in 
adhering to the provisions of investment treaties, including the prohibition 
of discrimination and the fair and equitable treatment standard, and by 
adopting general administrative law principles, such as due process, 
proportionality, and reasonableness?  While not every breach of local 
administrative law amounts to a breach of an investment treaty, relevant 
violations will come under the purview of arbitral tribunals.  The awards of 
arbitral tribunals may be in line with good cultural governance as UNESCO 
instruments require; however, unrestricted state sovereignty may jeopardize 
the protection of cultural heritage. 
Arbitral tribunals are developing common legal principles with an 
administrative character that may contribute, albeit indirectly, to the 
protection of cultural heritage.  Such administrative principles may be 
usefully applied in adjudication to preserve an appropriate balance between 
public and private interests.  While these administrative principles are not 
exclusive to the protection of cultural heritage,239 they do help shape 
cultural heritage law.  This jurisprudence may also influence other 
international courts and tribunals, and even legislators.  More importantly, 
this jurisprudence contributes to the development of common legal 
principles, requiring the protection of cultural heritage and the respect of 
legality, fairness, and good faith in cultural governance, as well as the 
prohibition of arbitrary or unreasonable measures. 
Thus, one could argue that administrative law is colonizing the space that 
was once occupied by international law, or perhaps more appropriately, that 
 
239  As such, these administrative law principles are not per se specific to the cultural 
field but are equally applicable in adjudications relating to other fields such as environmental 
protection and public health. Therefore, they may also promote good environmental 
governance and good public health governance. Yet, their application to the cultural field 
could further clarify their proper boundaries. 
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international law is colonizing the legal space that was traditionally 
occupied by administrative law.  In either case, administrative law and 
international law have gone beyond their traditional boundaries.  The 
intermingling of local and global, private and public, and national and 
international dimensions has created a complex, multi-polar, and multilevel 
legal system.  Whether these developments have given rise to a multipolar 
global cultural law is open to debate.  By taking elements of cultural 
heritage law into account, arbitral tribunals may contribute to the 
development of general principles of law that require the protection of 
cultural heritage, and balance public and private interests. 
Whether, in addition to promoting effective investment governance, 
arbitral tribunals can contribute to effective cultural governance remains to 
be seen.  Questions also remain as to whether investment treaty arbitration 
is the best forum to adjudicate cultural heritage disputes and whether 
investment treaty arbitration adequately balances private and public 
interests, not only from an investment law perspective but also from a 
cultural heritage law perspective.  At the end of the day, arbitral tribunals 
have a specific function: to settle disputes between investors and host states.  
They aim to provide fair treatment of foreign investors, and they endorse 
certain assumptions, namely that foreign direct investment spurs economic 
development of the host state.  In other words, arbitral tribunals have a 
mandate that differs from the mandate that a cultural heritage court would 
have if such a court existed.  On the one hand, there is a risk of 
retrogression in the protection of cultural heritage and epistemological 
misappropriation, as arbitral tribunals do not have specific expertise in 
cultural heritage matters.  On the other hand, there is also a risk of 
implosion in investor-state arbitration because some question investor-state 
arbitration’s legitimacy.  If the ultimate task of the arbitral tribunals is to 
ascertain eventual state liability for a wrongful act, the parameters for 
ascertaining what is wrongful under international investment law 
necessarily differ from the parameters for ascertaining a wrongful act under 
international cultural law.  Namely, international cultural law may justify 
certain measures that might otherwise be wrongful, or may even preclude 
the wrongfulness of a measure tout court.  Thus, whether a lex 
administrativa culturalis is effective as a tool of cultural governance 
remains to be seen. 
 
